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WASHINGTONAND LEE LA WREVIEW
gently inquired as to the status of the case before asserting failure of
notice as a basis for Rule 60(b)(6) relief." The Fourth Circuit's holding in
Hensley also serves as an implicit message to district courts to recon-
sider a case pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), but not to vacate and reenter the
final judgment for appeal purposes except under "unique" circum-
stances. 9
The strained analysis of the Hensley decision does not reveal,
however, whether the Rule 60(b)(6) movant must make a concomitant
showing of a putative meritorious claim or, conversely, whether the non-
moving party must show that vacation and reentry of the "final" judg-
ment will prejudice it.9" Further, it is not clear what unique circum-
stances will justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6), nor is it clear whether
failure to receive notice could ever provide the basis for Rule 60(b)
relief.9" Finally, although in the default or dismissal context courts
previously have resolved doubts in favor of granting relief from final
judgment,92 the logical extension of the Hensley ruling is to impose the
duty of diligent inquiry even in the default or dismissal case.
In short, the conceptual confusion the Hensley approach creates is
unsatisfactory because such confusion will only serve to prompt further
litigation within the Fourth Circuit, thereby frustrating the policy of
finality that the analysis sought to further. Nevertheless, the Fourth
Circuit in Hensley partially clarified both the limits within which the
district court is to exercise its discretion and the nature of the showing
that the prospective appellant must make when bringing a Rule 60(b)(6)
motion to extend the time for appeal.
WILLIAM D. JOHNSTON
V. COMMERCIAL LAW
A. The Activation and Enforceability of "Due-On-Sale" Clauses
The enforceability of "due-on-sale" clauses appearing in most sav-
ings and loan association mortgages has been the topic of much recent
litigation.' A "due-on-sale" clause allows a lender to accelerate the
See note 4 supra.
See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
See Equitable Power, supra note 31, at 429.
See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
9, See text accompanying note 88 supra.
92 See note 80 supra.
See Smart v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 500 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (22
consolidated cases involving enforceability of "due-on-sale" clauses).
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balance of a mortgage when a landowner transfers all or part of his prop-
erty to a third party.2 Lenders originally designed "due-on-sale" clauses
for protection against buyers of mortgaged property who are not as
financially sound as the original mortgagor.' Now lenders increasingly
use "due-on-sale" clauses as a method of keeping loan portfolios earning
current rates of interest.' Thus, when a purchaser of property attempts
to assume a mortgage charging lower than market interest, the savings
and loan association holding the mortgage may accelerate the balance
due if the purchaser refuses to refinance at current rates. Federal courts
generally uphold both the validity and enforceability of "due-on-sale"
clauses by employing the doctrine of federal preemption.' In Williams v.
See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732, 734 (N.D. Fla. 1981).
When a lender "accelerates" a mortgage, the lender declares the balance of the loan due and
payable. Id. A "due-on-sale" clause is a contractual right that grants the lender the power to
accelerate the balance of the mortgage. Id. See also 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1981) (definition of
"due-on-sale" clause and authority of savings and loans to use them).
' See generally Note, Enforcement of Due-On Transfer Clauses, 13 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 891, 894-95 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Enforcement]. Savings and loan institutions
currently use "due-on-sale" clauses to keep their investment portfolios earning the current
market rate of interest. Id. at 896. When the lender activates the "due-on-sale" clause, the
lender may insist that the homeowner-seller pay the balance of the outstanding mortgage.
Id. The lender then may reloan the funds at current rates. Id. Often, the lender may agree
not to accelerate the mortgage if the buyer will refinance the balance of the loan at prevail-
ing rates. Id.
'Id.
See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732, 741 (N.D. Fla. 1981)
(federal law preempts all state law dealing with use of "due-on-sale" clauses by federal sav-
ings and loans to obtain higher interest rates); Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'ns v.
Stein, 495 F. Supp. 12, 16 (E.D. Cal.), affd, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979), affd mem., 445 U.S.
921 (1981) ("due-on-sale" clauses both valid and enforceable because of federal preemption);
Bailey v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 1139, 1141 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (federal law
preempts any state regulation of lending practices of federal savings and loans). The federal
preemption doctrine stems from the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The preemption doctrine provides that if Congress intends federal
law on a subject to operate exclusively of state law, then courts must disregard the state
law. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-06 (1819). Congress may ex-
press an intent to make federal law exclusive either explicitly in the statutory language or
legislative history of the statute, or implicitly by creating a legislative or regulatory
framework so pervasive that the states have no room to act in the particular area. See Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,229-39 (1947). Both explicit and implicit preemptive
intent exist with respect to the use of "due-on-sale" clauses by federal savings and loans.
Federal preemptive intent is expressed with respect to "due-on-sale" clauses in the newly
amended Federal Home Loan Bank Board (F.H.L.B.B.) regulations, which state that the
F.H.L.B.B. soley governs the use of "due-on-sale" clauses by federal savings and loan
associations. 12 C.F.R. § 556.9(f)(2) (1981); see 50 U.S.L.W. 2105 (August 18, 1981). Congress
expressed its implicit preemptive intent to regulate federal savings and loan associations in
the creation of the F.H.L.B.B. See Dunn & Nowinski, Enforcement of Due-On Transfer
Clauses: An Update, 16 REAL. PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 291, 292-93 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Dunn & Nowinski]. Prior to the creation of the F.H.L.B.B., the public blamed the varied
practices of lending institutions in the several states for the large numbers of home mort-
gage defaults during the Depression era. Id. at 292. Congress reacted by creating a uniform
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First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Arlington,' the Fourth
Circuit addressed the issue of whether "due-on-sale" clauses in savings
and loan association mortgages are enforceable.7
In Williams, a homeowner desired to sell property upon which First
Federal Savings and Loan of Arlington (Arlington) held a thirty year
deed of trust' at a ten percent interest rate and containing a "due-on-
sale" clause.9 The homeowner entered into a standard real estate sales
contract for sale of the property to Jeffrey and Susan Williams." The
contract transferred to the Williamses the "beneficial interests" in a
land trust that the owner-seller was to create." By means of a separate
document, the owner-seller subsequently created the land trust, naming
herself as both trustee and beneficiary. 2 The homeowner then granted,
bargained, and assigned to herself as trustee the property subject to
Arlington's deed of trust.3 In addition, the owner-seller assigned her
beneficial interests 4 in the land trust, including all interest in the prop-
erty subject to the Arlington deed of trust, to the Williamses in
perpetuity. 5 Treating the assignment as a transfer by the homeowner
without the lender's consent, Arlington declared the balance of the
seller's mortgage to-be due and payable pursuant to the "due-on-sale"
clause in the homeowner's deed of trust agreement. The Williamses
system of federal saving and loan associations. Id. Congress also created the I'.H.L.B.B. and
gave it authority to develop a pervasive system for the operation of the federal savings and
loan system. Id. at 292-93.
651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 912.
Id. at 913-14. Deeds of trust are substantially equivalent to common-law mortgages.
Yasuna v. Miller, 399 A.2d 68, 71-72 (D.C. 1979). Virginia authorizes use of the deed of trust
instead of the mortgage prevalent in other states. Le Brun v. Prosise, 197 Md. 466, 473-74,
79 A.2d 543, 547 (1951).
' See 651 F.2d at 914 n.5. The actual note securing the homeowner's deed of trust was
not in the trial record. Id. The court calculated the interest rate on the note between 10 and
10.25%. Id. For convenience, the Williams court referred to the interest rate as 10%. Id.
, Id. at 916.
I1 !d.
13 Id. at 917.
"Id.
1 Id. The "beneficial interests" that the Williamses received encompassed all rights of
enjoyment, occupancy, and use. Id.
Is Id. In establishing the land trust comprised solely of the homeowner's property, the
homeowner attempted to alter the legal form of her rights of use and enjoyment in the
home from real to personal property. Id. The homeowner assigned her beneficial interests
to the Williamses with the intent to effectuate a conveyance of ownership rights without
tranferring legal title and thereby activating the "due-on-sale" clause. Id. at 917-18. Legal
title to the property remained in the land trust at all times. See note 26 infra.
" 651 F.2d at 914 n.7. The "due-on-sale" clause in the homeowner's deed of trust was
part of a uniform Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation instrument. Id. The "due-on-
sale" clause states that "If all or any of the property or an interest therein is sold or
transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written consent, . . .Lender may, at
Lender's option, declare all sums secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately due and
payable." Id.
[Vol. XXXlX
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brought suit in federal district court to determine their right to assume
the seller's mortgage.' The district court held that the assignment ac-
tivated the "due-on-sale" clause because the language of the Williams'
"due-on-sale" clause clearly stated that any conveyance or transfer of ti-
tle gives the lender the right to accelerate the balance of the mortgage. 8
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the Williamses argued that the
"due-on-sale" clause could not activate because the assignment of
beneficial interests to them from the owner-seller did not constitute a
transfer of title under the "due-on-sale" clause. 9 Moreover, the
Williamses argued that even if the "due-on-sale" clause did activate, the
clause was unenforceable as a prohibited restraint on alienation'0 or,
alternatively, as a violation of the Virginia antitrust law.' The Fourth
Circuit rejected the Williams' arguments, holding that the seller's
assignment of the "beneficial interests" activated the "due-on-sale"
clause." In addition, the Williams court concluded that the "due-on-sale"
clause was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation" or a violation of
Virginia antitrust law. 4 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's holding that the "due-on-sale" clause in the homeowner's
deed of trust agreement was enforceable upon the assignment of the
beneficial interests to the Williamses."
The Williamses argued that only a conveyance or transfer of title to
the mortgaged property could activate the "due-on-sale" clause. 8 Since
" Williams v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, mem. 500 F. Supp. 307, 309 (E.D. Va.
1980); see 651 F.2d at 914 n.7. Jurisdiction for the Williams' declaratory judgment suit
rested upon § 1331 of Title 28 of the United States Code. Id. Section 1331 allows all cases
arising under the laws of the United States to fall within the jurisdiction of the federal
district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 Sup. IV (1980). The federal question in Williams was
whether the passing of beneficial interests to the Williamses constituted a sale or transfer
under the federal regulation permitting "due-on-sale" clauses. 65f F.2d at 912 n.2; see 12
C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f), (g) (1980). Three separate cases attacking "due-on-sale" clauses were con-
solidated under the Williams caption for trial, with a fourth case added on appeal. 651 F.2d
at 912 nn 1&2.
IS Williams v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, mem. 500 F. Supp. 307, 309 (E.D. Va.
1980).
,1 651 F.2d at 916; text accompanying notes 26-32 infra.
21 651 F.2d at 921; text accompanying notes 45-61 infra. Alienability is the ability to
transfer property from one person to another. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 66 (5th ed.
1979). The prohibition on unreasonable restraints on alienability began with Quia Emptores,
The Statue of Westminster, 1290, 18 Edw. I, c. 1. See 651 F.2d at 921 n.25.
21 651 F.2d at 929; text accompanying fiotes 62-72 infra.
651 F.2d at 981 n.16.
" Id. at 929.
2 Id. at 931.
25 Id.
2 Md at 918. The Williamses argued that they had to acquire either a legal or equitable
title from the landowner in order to activate the "due-on-sale" clause. Id. The term "equitable
title" is the holding of beneficial interests by one person while the title of record is in
another. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 807-08 (5th ed. 1979) (legal/equitable title distinction).
Thus, in assigning her "beneficial interests" to the Williamses, the homeowner transferred
1982]
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the term "title" traditionally encompassed only title to real property,'
and because Virginia law defines a beneficiary's interests in a trust as
personalty,' the Wiliamses argued that the assignment of beneficial in-
terests in the land trust was not a transfer of title sufficient to activate
the "due-on-sale" clause.' The Williams court noted, however, that
whether the beneficial interests the Williamses received from the land-
owner constituted real or personal property was immaterial because by
its terms the "due-on-sale" clause in the landowners' deed of trust
operated if the owner sold or transferred the property or any interest
therein.30 Thus, the language of the "due-on-sale" clause drew no distinc-
tion between realty and personalty. Reasoning that the Williams' pur-
chase of the beneficial interests, including the right to possession, consti-
tuted a purchase of an "interest" in real estate, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the assignment of beneficial interests in the land trust
was a transfer of interest sufficient to activate the "due-on-sale" clause."
Moreover, the court noted that the Virginia statute on which the
Williamses relied to define beneficial interests in land trusts as person-
alty, expressly states that the statute's provisions are not to affect any
right that a creditor might assert against a trustee or beneficiary.2
The Fourth Circuit refused to accept the Williams' argument that
because the court disagreed with their definition of the term "title" an
ambiguity existed in the deed of trust.3 Since courts normally resolve am-
biguities in contracts against the party who drafted the document,' the
an equitable title that, according to the Williams' argument, would activate the
"due-on-sale" clause. See 651 F.2d at 918. The Williamses evaded this inconsistency by argu-
ing further that a transfer of "title" sufficient to activate the "due-on-sale" clause could
occur only by a transfer of real property. Id. The Williamses alleged that the beneficial in-
terests they received constituted personalty and not realty. Id.; see note 28 infra. Accord-
ingly, the Wiliamses contended that no transfer of realty took place. 651 F.2d at 918.
Early federal cases held that the term "title" could apply only to real estate. See
Jones v. Gould, 149 F. 153, 157 (6th Cir. 1906) (by strict definition, "title" applicable only to
real estate and rarely used in relation to intangible objects); United States v. Hunter, 21 F.
615, 617 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1884) (word "title" pertains to title in fee of real estate and not to
mere leasehold).
" See VA. CODE § 55-17.1 (1950). Section 55-17.1 states that a beneficiary's interest in a
land trust is deemed to be personalty. Id. See also Gately v. Gately, 316 F.2d 585, 587 (7th
Cir. 1963) (certificate of beneficial interest deemed to be personalty by deed of trust).
See 651 F.2d at 918.
o See 651 F.2d at 918 n.16; note 16 supra.
3, See 651 F.2d at 918-19. The Fourth Circuit relied on a definition of "title" that in-
cluded mere possession or a right to possession in determining that the Williams' beneficial
interests constituted a form of title. Id.; see 2 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 3281 (8th ed. 1914).
See 651 F.2d at 918 n.12; note 16 supra.
See 651 F.2d at 919.
See 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 621 (3d ed. 1961) and cases, cited therein. The ra-
tionale behind the rule that a contract is construed most strictly against its draftsman is
that the draftsman can prevent errors and ambiguities in meaning by carefully choosing his
words. Id& If the draftsmen fails to choose his words carefully, then he should bear the burden
of any ambiguity. Id.
[Vol. XX.XIX
FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
Williamses argued that the court should construe the ambiguity against
Arlington.' The Fourth Circuit noted, however, that despite the
Williams' claims that they did not hold title to the property, the
Williamses, nonetheless, owned the occupied the property upon comple-
tion of their transaction with the original landowner." Thus, the
Williams court reasoned that no ambiguity existed in the deed of trust
because the maneuvers of the landowner, when viewed together, com-
prised a transfer within the meaning of the "due-on-sale" clause.
3 7
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the Williams' contention that their
rights of enjoyment in the property constituted an "encumbrance"
subordinate to the deed of trust." In advancing the encumbrance argu-
ment, the Williamses sought to invoke language in the deed of trust ex-
pressly excluding a lien or encumbrance subordinate to the deed of trust
from the operation of the "due-on-sale" clause. 9 While .the Fourth Circuit
conceded that all possessory interests, or rights of enjoyment in the
property are subordinate to a deed of trust," the Williams court con-
cluded that the Williams' right of enjoyment was not a lien or encum-
brance, because the right of enjoyment did not serve the purpose of
securing the obligation to Arlington.4 ' Rather, the Williams court
reasoned that the Williams' interest, whether deemed a real or personal
property interest, was actually a fee simple beneficial ownership inter-
est in the property.42 Since a Virginia statute expressly prohibits
classification of an ownership interest as an encumbrance,43 the Fourth
See 651 F.2d at 919.
Id. at 918.
= Id. at 920. The Wilhlamses, by their various transactions with the homesowner, at-
tempted to effect a conveyance of ownership rights without making a transfer of title. Id. at
917. The Fourth Circuit held that no ambiguity existed with respect to the word "title"
because the Williams' deed of trust did not employ the term. Id. at 918 n.16. The Williams'
"due-on-sale" clause did, however, contain the term "transfer:' See note 16 supra. The
Williams court noted that a determination of whether a transfer occurred required exami-
nation of the transaction as a whole. 651 F.2d at 919-20. Reasoning that after the transac-
tion, the homeowner no longer owned and occupied the property but that the Williamses
did, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the transactions constituted a transfer sufficient to
trigger the "due-on-sale" clause. Id. at 920.
1 Id. The Williamses received the right of enjoyment in the homeowner's property as
part of their assignment of beneficial interests. Id. at 917.
" Id. at 920-21. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g) (1981). Section 545.8-3(g) provides in part:
(1) ... a Federal association may not exercise a due-on-sale clause based on any
of the following:
(a) Creation of a lien of encumberance subordinate to the association's security
instrument.
Id. The Williams' deed of trust incorporated the provisions of § 545.8-3(g). See 651 F.2d at
920.
" See 651 F.2d at 920. .
41 Id.
42 Id.
I Id. at 920 n.22; see VA. CODE § 8.9-105(g) (1950). Section 8.9-105(g) states that an en-
cumberance includes real estate mortgages and other rights that are not ownership inter-
19821
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Circuit held that the Williams' right of enjoyment did not constitute an
encumbrance subordinate to the deed of trust preventing operation of
the "due-on-sale" clause."
In determining whether the "due-on-sale" clause was a restraint on
alienation, the Williams court declined to decide whether the federal
government had preempted any state regulation of "due-on-sale" clauses
in the loan instruments of federal savings and loan associations." While
expressly disavowing any intent to discredit the many federal decisions
validating. "due-on-sale" clauses on the basis of preemption,4 6 the Fourth
Circuit stated that due to uncertainties resulting from the facts of the
case,47 the preemption question was best put aside. 8 The Fourth Circuit
concluded, however, that standing alone, a "due-on-sale" clause cannot
constitute a restraint on alienability.49 A "due-on-sale" clause serves to
remove a lien or encumbrance on the property by requiring payment of
the balance of the mortgage." Thus, the Williams court-suggested that
"due-on-sale" clauses enable land to become more, not less, alienable."
ests. Id. Since the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the Williams' rights of enjoyment consti-
tuted ownership rights, the rights of enjoyment could not qualify as an encumberance under
Virginia law. 651 F.2d at 920 n.22.
651 F.2d at 920 n.22.
'5 Id. at 921; see note 5 supra.
, 651 F.2d at 922.
' Id. Three uncertainties that the Williams factual situation created precluded the
Fourth Circuit from deciding the case on preemption grounds. Id. The first uncertainty
arose because not all of the savings and loans employing "due-on-sale" clauses in Williams
held federal charters. Id. The Fourth Circuit expressed doubt whether preemption could
apply to a state chartered savings and loan. Id. Secondly, the Williams' entered into the
deed of trust prior to the effective date of the federal "due-on-sale" regulations. Id. The
Williams court noted that federal courts have conflicting views on whether preemption ap-
plies to the enforceability of agreements containing "due-on-sale" clauses entered into prior
to the effective date of the federal regulations. Id.; see Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'ns v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 12, 17 (E.D. Cal.) (preemption applies whether contract entered
into before or after effective date of federal regulations) aff'd 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979),
affd mem. 445 U.S. 921 (1980). But see Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 481 F. Supp.
616, 633 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (preemption applies to contracts entered into after effective date of
federal regulations). Finally, the federally-formulated deed of trust created an uncertainty
by stating that the law of the jurisdiction in which the property is located controlled. 651
F.2d at 922.
:8 Id. at 923.
' Id. The Williams court found the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Occidental
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 471, 293 N.W.2d 843, 845 (1980), per-
suasive authority that "due-on-sale" clauses are not restraints on alienability for any pur-
pose. See note 99 infra.
See 651 F.2d at 923 n.29.
Id. A fallacy exists in the position that "due-on-sale" clauses enhance alienability by
removing the encumberance of the existing mortgage. A "due-on-sale" clause only acceler-
ates the mortgage after sale of the property. See text accompanying note 2 supra. Since
alienability describes the ability to transfer, a clause that activates after the sale cannot
enhance alienability. Any purchase decision inevitably takes place before the clause
becomes effective.
[Vol. XXXlX
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Moreover, the homeowner whose property is subject to a "due-on-sale"
clause remains free to sell and realize as much on the sale of his property
as a homeowner selling unencumbered land.52 The Fourth Circuit noted
that the effect of a "due-on-sale" clause from a market standpoint is
merely to equalize the amounts realized from the sales of encumbered
and unencumbered land by requiring the purchasers of both types of
land to obtain financing at prevailing market rates." Otherwise, the
seller of encumbered property could demand and receive a higher price
for his land because the purchaser could assume the seller's lower inter-
est mortgage.-"
Even if "due-on-sale" clauses were restraints on alienation the
Williams court noted that the Virginia legislature sanctioned the clauses
when it enacted statutes providing special notice requirements for mort-
gages containing "due-on-sale" clauses.5 Generally, the need to obtain
the prior consent of another before a sale of property can occur
characterizes a restraint on alienation. 6 The Fourth Circuit observed,
however, that the Williams' "due-on-sale" clause did not require the
lender's consent before any sale of the property could occur, but only
permitted the lender to accelerate the mortgage upon sale of the prop-
erty without consent.5 ' Although the law generally favors borrowers'
rights over those of lenders, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that lenders,
by complying with the law, acquire legally enforceable rights.,, The
Williams court held that Arlington had complied fully with the law
because the "due-on-sale" clause did not require the lender's prior con-
sent to a sale" and did not force the homeowner-seller to pay any penalty
for prepayment resulting from activation of the "due-on-sale" clause."5
See 651 F.2d at 923 n.29.
Id. at 915 n.8.
'Id.
Id. at 924; see VA. CODE § 6.1-330.34 (1950). Section 6.1-330.34 of the Virginia Code re-
quires mortgages containing a "due-on-sale" clause to provide a conspicuous notice that such
a clause is part of the instrument. Id.
" See Pellerito v. Weber, 22 Mich. App. 242, 245, 177 N.W.2d 236, 237-38 (1970) (to
declare forfeiture under clause requiring lender's consent prior to sale of property would
constitute restraint on alienation). See generally Volkmer, The Application of the
Restraints on Alienation Doctrine toRealProperty SecurityInterests, 58 IOWA L. REV. 747,
764 (1973).
'4 See 651 F.2d at 925; note 16 supra. Clauses that state that selling the property
without the lender's consent constitutes a breach of contract are "disabling restraints" on
alienability, which are unenforceable. See Lohmann v. Adams, -Okla.- , - 540
P.2d 522, 555 (1975) ("disabing restraints" unenforceable per se). See also RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 401(1}(a) (1944) (definition of "disabling restraint"). The Williams "due-on-sale"
clause only allowed the lender to accelerate the mortgage upon the homeowner's violation
of the clause. See note 16 supra. The clause did not deem a violation to be a breach of the
deed of trust contract entitling the lender to damages. Id.
651 F.2d at 926.
'4Id. at 928.
'4Id.; see 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g) (202) (1981); VA. CODE § 6.1-330.33 (1950). Both §§
545.8-3(g)(2) and 6.1-330.33 prohibit the extraction ofany prepayment fee or penalty from
the homeowner-seller as the result of acceleration under a "dre-on-sale" clause. Id. As for a
1982]
WASHINGTONAND LEE LA WREVIEW
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit held that Arlington had a legal right to
enforce the "due-on-sale" clause in the Williams' deed of trust.1
In determining whether the "due-on-sale" clause violated Virginia
antitrust law, the Williams court noted that no evidence existed that
Arlington's adoption of the "due-on-sale" clause was the result of any
conspiracy or other prohibited combination.2 The Fourth Circuit observ-
ed that each lender was able to perceive the benefits of "due-on-sale"
clauses and institute their use." Moreover, the Williams court noted
that "due-on-sale" clauses specify only a time at which a lender may col-
lect a mortgage debt. 4 Thus, the court concluded that the "due-on-sale"
clause did not violate Virginia antitrust law because the mere collection
of a debt cannot constitute an antitrust violation. 5 Additionally, the
Virginia antitrust statute exempts from its application conduct govern-
ed by either a federal or state administrative agency." Although one of
the defendant savings and loans in Williams was state chartered,' the
Fourth Circuit held that the state chartered savings and loan had suffi-
cient contacts with federal agencies to allow the federal agencies to con-
sider the anticompetitive effects of "due-on-sale" clauses.6 8 Since federal
agencies could govern the conduct of the state chartered savings and
loan, the Williams court reasoned that the savings and loan's use of the
"due-on-sale" clause fell within the statutory exemption of the Virginia
antitrust law. 9 In addition, Virginia's antitrust law specifically exempts
from its operation any conduct that is "authorized, regulated or approv-
ed" by a Virginia statute." Reasoning that a Virginia statutory provision
requires the use of a special printed notice of a "due-on-sale" clause on
prepayment charge not accompanying a sale of the property, neither the Potes, plaintiffs in
one of the consolidated cases, nor the Williamses could complain of an illegality on behalf of
their respective lenders. See 651 F.2d at 928-29. A Virginia Code section limited any possi-
ble prepayment penalty to 2/o of the amount prepaid. VA. CODE § 6.1-330.27.1 (1950). The
maximum prepayment penalty chargeable under the terms of either the Potes' or Williams'
deed of trust was 2%. See 651 F.2d at 928-29 nn. 40-42.
6, 651 F.2d at 929.
62 Id.; see VA. CODE § 59.1-9.5 (1950). Section 59.1-9.5 of the Virginia Code states that
any combination, contract, or conspiracy in restraint of trade is unlawful. Id. The arguments
that the "due-on-sale" clauses constituted restraints an alienation and per se violations of
the antitrust law were solely the Potes'. See 651 F.2d at 912 n.2.
Id. at 930.
u Id.
I Id.; see Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 755-57 (1947) (amount
owed under contract held collectable even though amount contained premium resulting
from violation of antitrust law).
See VA. CODE § 59.1-9.4(b)(2) (1950).
'7 651 F.2d at 922. Washington-Lee Savings & Loan, the Potes' lender, was not fede-
rally chartered. Id.
" Id. at 930. The Fourth Circuit noted that Washington-Lee Savings & Loan was inti-
mately related to the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board because these agencies
developed and approved the deed of trust that Washington-Lee used. Id.
69 Id.
o Id. at 931; see VA. CODE § 59.1-9.4(b)(1) (1950).
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any mortgage containing such a clause," the Fourth Circuit concluded
that "due-on-sale" clauses are sufficiently authorized, regulated or con-
trolled by Virginia statute to be exempted from operation of the anti-
trust law.
72
The Fourth Circuit reasoned correctly that the assignment of benefi-
cial interests in the homeowner-seller's property constituted a transfer
of title in the property sufficient to activate the "due-on-sale" clause in
the deed of trust.' By its terms, the "due-on-sale" clause did not
distinguish between a transfer of interest in realty and an interest in
personalty. 4 Rather, the lender provided that a sale or transfer of "any"
interest incident to the homeowner-seller's property would activate the
"due-on-sale" clause in the deed of trust.75 Since the homeowner's sale or
transfer of the "beneficial interests" in the property was clearly the
transfer of an interest in the property, the "due-on-sale" clause was acti-
vated when the Williamses purchased the "beneficial interest" in the
homeowner's land trust, the corpus of which was the property subject to
the Arlington deed of trust. Moreover, the assignment of the "beneficial
interests" in the land trust granted the Williamses the complete right to
enjoy, occupy, and use the land in perpetuity. 8 Courts have held tradi-
tionally that a full right of occupancy or possession may constitute a
form of title to real property.7  The Fourth Circuit was correct,
therefore, in defining the transfer of beneficial interests, including a full
right of possession in perpetuity, to constitute a transfer of title in the
property sufficient to activate the "due-on-sale" clause. Moreover, the
Williams court properly refused to apply the doctrine of ambiguity to
" 651 F.2d at 931. See VA. CODE § 59.1-9.4(b)(1) (1950).
651 F.2d at 931. Congress has designated the Federal Home Loan Bank Board an
agency of the United States. 12 U.S.C. § 1437(b) (1976). The Federal Home Loan Bank Board
promulgated the "due-on-sale" clauses at issue in Williams. 651 F.2d at 914 n.6 & 7. Conse-
quently, the creation of the "due-on-sale" clauses in Williams is the act of a federal agency.
71 651 F.2d at 919 n.16.
71 Id.; see note 16 supra.
7' 651 F.2d at 914 n.7; note 16 supra.
7' 651 F.2d at 917.
See United States v. Shoeshone Tribe, 85 Ct. Cl. 331 (1937), aff'd, 304 U.S. 111 (1938);
Singleton v. State, 260 N.C. 451, 459, 133 S.E.2d 183, 189 (1963).
In Shoshone, an Indian tribe sued the United States to recover the value of timber and
minerals that the federal government removed from the tribe's reservation. 304 U.S. at 111.
In holding for the plaintiff, the Court of Claims stated that although legal title of the reser-
vation belonged to the United States, the right of occupancy was the real ownership and the
full title to the property. 85 Ct. Cl. at 375. The Supreme Court affirmed stating that the
right of occupancy was as "sacred as the fee" itself. 304 U.S. at 115. An analogy exists be-
tween the Shoshone facts and those of Williams. In Shoshone, the United States held legal
title to the property in question, but the Shoshones had the right of occupancy. Id. In
Williams, the land trust held the legal title to the home while the Williamses possessed the
right of occupancy. See note 15 supra. See also Garlock v. Fulton County, 116 Pa. Super. 50,
52, 176 A. 38, 39 (1935) (although lowest form of title, possession is good against anyone not
having better title).
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the Arlington deed of trust." Courts only should apply the ambiguity
doctrine to construe a document whose language is ambiguous and un-
clear.79 Since the Arlington deed of trust stated expressly that a transfer
of "any" interest in the property would activate the "due-on-sale"
clause," no ambiguity existed concerning whether the transfer of only
the beneficial interests in the property could activate the clause."'
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the Williams' right of enjoy-
ment in the property did not constitute an encumbrance subordinate to
the deed of trust that would preclude application of the "due-on-sale"
clause also appears sound. Courts traditionally classify the right of en-
joyment in property as an attribute of ownership.2 Since Virginia law
excludes all ownership interests from the statutory definition of encum-
brance," the Fourth Circuit properly classified the Williams' right of en-
joyment as an ownership interest and not an encumbrance subordinate
to the deed of trust.4 Moreover, the encumbrance exception in deeds of
trust was intended originally as a very limited exception to the opera-
tion of due-on-sale clauses. 5 If courts defined an encumbrance to include
rights of enjoyment, the encumbrance term could encompass any inter-
est created in property, and thereby preclude enforcement of all due-on-
sale clauses."
Federal courts previously have not addressed whether a "due-on-
sale" clause constitutes a prohibited restraint on alienability.' The
absence of clear federal precedent forced the Fourth Circuit to turn to
state court decisions for judicial precedent concerning whether "due-on-
sale" clauses constitute restraints on alienability."8 State courts have
divided, however, concerning whether "due-on-sale" clauses used for
7' 651 F.2d at 919; notes 34 & 37 supra.
78 See Williams Schluderberg-T.J. Kurdle Co. v. Trice, 198 Va. 85, 88-89, 92 S.E.2d 374,
377 (1956); People's Bank v. People's Nat'l Bank, 148 Va. 651, 659-60, 139 S.E. 325, 327 (1927).
"See note 16 supra.
81 651 F.2d at 919.
" See Buchanan v. Wharley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917) (ownership of property includes free
use, enjoyment, and disposal). Accord, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 997 (5th ed. 1979).
See VA. CODE § 8.9-105(g) (1950); note 43 supra.
" See 651 F.2d at 920; note 82 supra.
See 651 F.2d at 920. The limited scope intended for the encumbrance exception to
the operation of a "due-on-sale" clause is demonstrated by statements from Federal Home
Loan Bank Board and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation officials that the encum-
brance exception only applies to the creation of a lien on the borrower's interest. See Dunn
& Nowinsky, supra note 5, at 302.
651 F.2d at 920.
See Enforcement, supra note 3,; Dunn & Nowinsky, supra note 5 (comprehensive
report discussing only state cases on alienability issue). Federal preemption grounds decid-
ed previous federal cases holding "due-on-sale" clauses to be valid and enforceable. See note
5 supra. The Williams court, however, declined to address the preemption question because
particular facts of the case rendered the applicability of the preemption doctrine uncertain.
See note 47 supra.
1 651 F.2d at 923-25.
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portfolio management purposes constitute restraints on alienability. 9
Several state courts have held that "due-on-sale" clauses by their nature
unreasonably restrain alienability, and thus, should be enforced only
when the lender can establish that the sale of the encumbered property
would impair or jeopardize the security for the underlying loan.90 Other
state courts hold, however, that "due-on-sale" clauses do not restrain
alienability and are fully enforceable.9'
Courts refusing to enforce "due-on-sale" clauses as restraints on
alienability focus generally on whether the lender can establish suffi-
cient legitimate interests to justify use of the clause.92 Employing a
balancing test, courts weigh the quantum of restraint that a "due-on-
sale" clause imposes on alienability against the justifications favoring
enforcement. 93 Courts, however, do not consider portfolio maintenance a
legitimate interest of the lender's sufficient to outweigh the "due-on-
sale" clause's restraining effect on alienation because enforcement of the
Compare, Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, -'
293 N.W.2d 843, 845 (1980) ("due-on-sale" clause does not restrain alienation and use of
clause for portfolio maintenance is equitable); Mills v. Nashua Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No.
80-259 (N.H. S. Ct. August 10, 1981) ("due-on-sale" clauses not restraints on alienation);
Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Sav. Ass'n, 615 S.W.2d 333, 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) ("due-on-
sale" clause cannot be classified as restraint on alienation) with Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am.,
21 Cal. 3d 943, 952, 582 P.2d 970, 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385 (1978) ("due-on-sale" clauses
used for portfolio maintenance constitute unreasonable restraint on alienability); Nichols v.
Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 167, 250 N.W.2d 804, 809 (1977)
(same); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, -, 481 S.W.2d 725, 729
(1972) (same). See generally Comment, Due-On Clauses: Restraints on Alienation And The
Legitimacy Of Portfolio Maintenance, 14 WILLAMETTE L.J. 295, 301 (1978).
" See Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 952, 582 P.2d 970, 976, 148 Cal. Rptr.
379, 385 (1978); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 168, 250
NW.2d 804, 809 (1977).
91 See Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 615 S.W.2d 333, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981); Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, -, 293 N.W.2d
843, 845 (1980).
2 See Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 951, 582 P.2d 970,975,148 Cal. Rptr.
379, 384 (1978); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 168, 250
N.W.2d 804, 809 (1977); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, -, 481
S.W.2d 725, 729 (1972).
The California Supreme Court's decision in Wellenkamp is representative of state
court decisions refusing enforcement of "due-on-sale" clauses for portfolio maintenance pur-
poses. In Wellenkamp, the court addressed the issue of whether "due-on-sale" clauses con-
stitute unreasonable restraints on alienability. The Wellenkamp court concluded that the
lender's interest in maintaining its loan portfolio at current rates of interest did not justify
the restraint that "due-on-sale" clauses place on alienation. 21 Cal. 3d at 952, 582 P.2d at 976,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 385. The Wellenkamp dissent, however, strongly criticized the majority
opinion for putting a heavy economic burden on savings and loans in order to guaranty the
homeowner-seller a low-interest transferrable mortgage for which he never bargained. 21
Cal. 3d at 957, 582 P.2d at 979, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 388. The Fourth Circuit adopted the
arguments of the Wellenkamp dissent in Williams. See 651 F.2d at 923 n.29.
'" See Welenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 949, 582 P.2d 970, 974, 148 Cal. Rptr.
379, 383 (1978).
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clause would not further the original objective of "due-on-sale" clauses of
protecting against impairment of security.94 Lenders providing long-
term real estate loans take into account projections of future economic
conditions when determining the original interest rates on a particular
loan.95 Accordingly, courts holding that "due-on-sale" clauses constitute
unreasonable restraints on alienability refuse to place the burden of the
lender's faulty economic projections on the landowner-seller via the
clauses, unless enforcement is necessary to preserve the lender's secur-
ity interest in the property.98
State court decisions holding "due-on-sale" clauses not to be
restraints on alienation rely generally on the Restatement of Property
as authority.97 Restatement section 404 defines a restraint on alienation
as an attempt by an otherwise effective conveyance or contract to cause
a later conveyance to be void,9" to impose contractual liability on the con-
veyor for breach of an agreement not to convey,99 or to terminate all or
part of the property interest conveyed. 10 Since the effect of a "due-on-
sale" clause in making the balance of the mortgage due and payable'01 is
not one of the effects that the Restatement expressly prohibits, some
courts reason that "due-on-sale" clauses do not constitute prohibited
restraints on alienation. °2
" See Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 953, 582 P.2d 970, 977, 148 Cal. Rptr.
379, 386 (1978); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 174, 250
N.W.2d 804, 806-07 (1977); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, -'
481 S.W.2d 725, 729 (1972).
'" See Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 952, 582 P.2d 970, 976, 148 Cal. Rptr.
379, 385 (1978).
See id.
See Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Sav. Ass'n, 615 S.W.2d 333, 338 n.15 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1981); Mills v. Nashua Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. 80-259 (N.H. S. Ct. Aug. 10, 1981);
Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, -, 293 N.W.2d 843,
845 (1980). The Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Occidental is representative of state
court decisions upholding "due-on-sale" clauses against restraint on alienability attacks. In
Occidental, the court considered the question of whether "due-on-sale" clauses constitute
restraints on alienability. 206 Neb. at -, 293 N.W.2d at 845. The Occidental court relied
on the Restatement of Property in holding that "due-on-sale" clauses in no way restrain
alienability. Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected the Wellenkamp holding and criti-
cized the Wellenkamp court for putting an unreasonable burden on lenders stemming from
the lender's increased exposure to economic harm during inflationary periods when "due-on-
sale" clauses are unenforceable. 206 Neb. at -, 293 N.W.2d at 847-49. The Williams court
accepted the Occidental holding. 651 F.2d at 923 n.29. The Fourth Circuit also recognized
the economic policy underlying the Occidental decision. Id. at 930 n.47; see text accompany-
ing notes 112-18 infra.




... See text accompanying note 2 supra.
02 See Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 615 S.W.2d 333, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981); Mills v. Nashua Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 80-259 (N.H. S. Ct. Aug. 10, 1981); Occi-
dental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, -, 293 N.W.2d 843, 845
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The position of the Fourth Circuit in Williams upholding "due-on-
sale" clauses appears sound. First, the balancing test that some courts
use in determining whether a "due-on-sale" clause is a "reasonable"
restraint on alienation when used for portfolio maintenance, ' assumes
that the rights and needs of the seller outweigh those of the lender."4
The balancing test, however, disregards the fact that the seller and
lender freely have entered into a contract to the contrary.1 5 Secondly,
the homeowner-seller is not disadvantaged due to the lender's-use of a
"due-on-sale" clause because, under a standard mortgage, the lender
never promises that a third party can assume the seller's mortgage."6
Moreover, if the lender cannot adjust its loan portfolio via "due-on-sale"
clauses, the seller of encumbered property obtains a premium for sale of
the land at the expense of the lender.' 7 The seller's premium results
from free market economic forces. When mortgage money is difficult to
obtain, the seller of encumbered property whose mortgage does not con-
tain an enforceable "due-on-sale" clause can provide automatic financing
at lower than market rates of interest to any purchaser willing to
assume the seller's mortgage.' 8 A buyer may be willing to pay. a
premium over what the property would cost unencumbered as consi-
deration for the privilege of assuming the seller's mortgage at the lower
than market interest rate.09 Thus, the seller's assumable mortgage may
(1980). Courts holding "due-on-sale" clauses unenforceable begin generally with the assump-
tion that "due-on-sale" clauses are restraints on alienability. See Occidental Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. at -, 293 N.W.2d at 845; Enforcement, supra note
3, at 898-201. The court then employs some form of balancing test to determine if the
lender's interests make the existing restraint reasonable. See Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am.,
21 Cal. 3d at 948, 582 P.2d at 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383. The state courts holding "due-on-
sale" clauses to be enforceable, however, compare the effect of a "due-on-sale" clause with
the Restatement definition of a restraint on alienation and find "due-on-sale" clauses not to
be restraints in any way. See Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb.
at -, 293 N.W.2d at 845. Since the courts upholding "due-on-sale" clauses do not begin
their analysis with the assumption that "due-on-sale" clauses are restraints on alienability,
and because the courts subsequently determine that "due-on-sale" clauses do not constitute
restraints in any way, the courts never reach the reasonable restraint issue.
" See text accompanying note 93 supra.
'' See Occidental Say. & Loans Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. at -, 243
N.W.2d at 847. The balancing test courts use to determine whether "due-on-sale" clauses
constitute reasonable restraints on alienability assumes that the lenders' rights are second-
ary to those of the homeowner because the test requires the lender to justify its rights
before the court will recognize them. Id.
10 Id. The lender and homeowner contractually have given priority to the lender's
rights by allowing the lender to include a "due-on-sale" acceleration clause in the mortgage.
At the same time, the homeowner has not contracted for guaranteed assumability of his
mortgage. Id.
I" Id. at 848.
107 Id.
" See Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 957, 582 P.2d 970, 979, 148 Cal. Rptr.
379, 388 (1978) (Clark, J., dissenting).
109 Id.
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become a valuable asset to the seller.11 If "due-on-sale" clauses are not
enforced for portfolio management purposes, the seller of encumbered
property may acquire an unbargained for advantage over the seller of
similar, unencumbered land."'
Strong policy considerations also support the Fourth Circuit's
holdings that "due-on-sale" clauses are enforceable and that the intricate
maneuvers of the Williams homeowner-seller activated the "due-on-sale"
clause. Savings and loan associations provide a majority of all residential
mortgages in the United States.' The term of the average savings and
loan mortgage for previously occupied homes, however, extends far
longer than 25 years. 13 In periods of rising interest rates, savings and
loan associations are vulnerable to economic pressures stemming from
investment portfolios that are heavy with long-term, fixed-rate invest-
ments."' Savings and loan profits may decline due to an increasing dif-
ferential between the rising rate of interest the savings and loan is
forced to pay to attract new depositors and the fixed rate of interest the
savings and loan earns from its long-term loans."' Savings and loan pro-
fits also may fall because of increased costs to the savings and loan
resulting from the necessity of borrowing funds at prevailing market
rates to compensate for funds that depositors withdraw and place into
other, more lucrative, investments. 6 Moreover, a dual risk falls on
lenders who cannot use "due-on-sale" clauses. When market interest
110 Id.
, Id. at 955, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
112 See Enforcement, supra note 3, at 895 n.6.
"13 Id.
11 See Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, -, 293
N.W.2d 843, 849 (1980).
1I See id. Without "due-on-sale" clauses, savings and loans are locked into long-term,
fixed-rate investments. Id. The funds necessary to make the investments (loans) come
primarily from short-term savings accounts and certificates. Id In order to continue at-
tracting depositors, savings and loans must offer a return near the prevailing market rate.
Id. As the cost of obtaining funds rises for the savings and loan, the differential between
what the savings and loan must pay in interest to depositors and what the savings and loan
earns from its long-term loans increases. Id. Thus, savings and loan profits decrease. Id. If
the interest rate differential gets too large, the savings and loan may fail. Id.
"'1 Savings and loan profits can decrease through disintermediation. See Enforcement,
supra note 3, at 895 n.6. Disintermediation occurs when market interest rates exceed the in-
terest rates available to depositors from savings and loans, and the depositors take their
money out of the savings and loans and invest elsewhere. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 421
(5th ed. 1979). In periods of rising interest rates, the liquidity of savings and loans steadily
decreases due to disintermediation. See Enforcement, supra note 3, at 895 n.6. To acquire
extra funds, the savings and loan must borrow on the open market. Id. The subsequent
heavy borrowing at high rates forces profits down. Id. "Due-on-sale" clauses provide a
safety valve that allows a savings and loan to keep investments earning current market
rates. See Ashley, Use of "Due-On" Clauses To Gain Collateral Benefits: A Common-Sense
Defense, 10 TULSA L.J. 590, 593-94 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Ashley]. At the same time,
"due-on-sale" clauses work to improve liquidity by allowing savings and loans to call loans
upon sale of encumbered property or require refinancing at current rates. Id.
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rates fall, the savings and loan will lose high-yielding investments due to
prepayment."' Rising market rates preclude the lender from updating
the yield from its loan portfolio by using "due-on-sale" acceleration.' 8
As a result of the importance of savings and loans in the American
housing market and their financial jeopardy in prolonged periods of in-
flation, lenders now increasingly utilize "due-on-sale" clauses and other
protective devices."9 In light of the policy underlying "due-on-sale"
clauses of protecting savings and loan profits and liquidity,"20 the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Williams that a transfer of beneficial interests in
property activated the "due-on-sale" clause,"' and that the "due-on-sale"
clause was enforceable when triggered,"' constitutes a sound choice in
today's economy. A contrary holding would provide a convenient method
for homeowners to circumvent the "due-on-sale" clause and consequently
endanger the financial stability of savings and loan associations.
Moreover, by resolving the alienation issue in favor of the savings and
loan, the Fourth Circuit has established federal precedent that "due-on-
sale" clauses are not by nature restraints on the alienability of land. The
sound reasoning of the Williams court arguably may influence the
previous positions that state courts have taken in rejecting the enforce-
ability of "due-on-sale" clauses for portfolio maintenance purposes.
MILLARD L. FRETLAND
"' A savings and loan faces exposure to a double risk when it cannot use "due-on-sale"
clauses. See Enforcement, supra note 3, at 896. The double risk stems from the borrower's
ability to prepay the balance of the mortgage due if market rates fall and refinance
elsewhere. Id. The savings and loan then has lost a high interest investment and is left with
funds to lend at a less desirable rate. Id. On the other hand, if rates rise, the savings and
loan cannot take advantage of the higher rates because it cannot acdelerate the loan con-
tract via a "due-on-sale" clause. Id.
"' Id. at 896-97.
", Id. at 896 n.6. See generally Cowan & Foley, New Trends in Residential Mortgage
Finance, 13 REAL PROP. PROB & TR. J. 1075 (1978). One protective device that savings and
loans use in periods of inflation is the variable rate mortgage (VRM). Id. A VRM charges a
rate of interest that is tied to an economic index of average mortgage rates. See 12 C.F.R. §
545.604(c) (1981). If market rates fall, the savings and loan must lower the rate on each VRM.
Id. Alternatively, if market rates rise, and savings and loan may increase the VRM interest
rate. Id. Both increases and decreases of VRM rates must remain within certain limits. Id.
Another protective device is the renegotiable rate mortgage (RRM). An RRM is a loan
issued for a period of three, four, or five years and automatically renewable at equal inter-
vals thereafter. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(a) (1981). Other RRM's bear a single term of thirty
years with the interest rate automatically renegotiable every four'or five years. Id. Interest
rates adjust up or down within certain limits according to an economic index. Id.
'2 651 F.2d at 930 nA7. See text accompanying notes 112-18 supra.
651 F.2d at 919 n.16. See generally Ashley, supra note 116, at 593 (policy of protect-
ing savings and loan liquidity); Volkmer, The Application Of The Restraints On Alienation
Doctrine To Real Property Security Interests, 58 IOWA L. Ruv. 747, 796-99 (1973) (policy of
protecting savings and loan profitability).
'2 651 F.2d at 931.
1982]
